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INTRODUCTION
Large institutions such as banks, franchisers, international compa
nies, and lessors distrust juries' ability to properly resolve disputes and
award reasonable damages. As a result, these and other actors have
attempted to limit juries' potential influence on the contracts to which
they are parties. They have done so through contractual jury trial
waiver clauses1 in these agreements.2
* The author would like to thank University of Michigan Law School professors
Richard Friedman and Samuel Gross for their thoughtful ideas, and the Michigan Law
Review editors and staff, in particular Sean Lewis and John McNichols, for their editorial
wisdom.
1. These contractual waivers occasionally exist concurrently with mandatory binding
arbitration agreements, but often they exist independently. This Note will not tackle the
issue of arbitration agreements and jury trial waivers. For scholarship on that complicated
topic, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight,

Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 691 (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration] (discussing the Seventh Amendment jury trial waiver standard as appli
cable to both jury trial waivers and arbitration agreements); and Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea
or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986)
(equipment-lease agreement); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir.
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The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the jury
trial right.3 Whether the right is determined to exist in an individual
instance is a matter of federal common law,4 which merely preserves
the jury trial right as it existed when the Amendment was adopted in
1791.5 Although the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a
1985) (lending agreement); Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.
1977) (equipment-lease agreement); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813
(N.D. Tex. 2002) (debt guarantee); Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc.,
56 F. Supp. 2d 982, 938 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (master-service agreement); Luis Acosta, Inc. v.
Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. P.R. 1996) (lien agreement); Phoenix Leasing Inc. v.
Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994) (lending agreement), affd, 89 F.3d
846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion); Bonfield v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 589, 594-96 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (franchise agreement); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989) (construction
contract); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982)
(dealer agreement).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id. For a brief history of the ratification of the Amendment, see Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).

4. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 221 (1963) (per curium); see also Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that the Seventh Amendment
does not apply to the states).
5. Courts apply a historical analysis to determine whether the jury trial right would have
existed in eighteenth-century England. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1987).
Hence, a jury trial right exists only when the dispute, viewed in this historical context, would
have been heard by a jury at common law. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2301, at 14-15 (2d ed. 1994). No right ex
ists when the dispute would have been tried in the courts of equity. Id. Since the merger of
law and equity in 1938, courts must determine which claims are legal and which are equitable
by looking to 1791 English custom and the remedy sought. See FED. R. Clv. P. 2; Baltimore
& Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); see also
Groome v. Steward, 142 F.2d 756, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (stating that this is the only area in
which the distinction between law and equity has any further procedural significance); Note,
The Effect of the Merger of Law and Equity on the Right of the Jury Trial in Federal Courts,
36 GEO. L.J. 666, 666 (1948).
This approach has been the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment
beginning with Justice Story's 1812 opinion on circuit in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas.
745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812), when he stated:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of any individ
ual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reser
voir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this
opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the
law.
The historical approach is the primary test for determining whether the jury trial right
exists, but is not rigidly followed. Lower courts have developed many procedures for
checking jury abuses, yet the Court has found them all to be consistent with the Seventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (nonmutual col
lateral estoppel); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (rernittitur); Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (retrial limited to the question of damages); Fid. & Deposit
Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (summary judgment).
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jury trial, it does not mandate one. As with other constitutional rights,
this right may be waived.6
For those issues that may go to a jury, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") 38 creates a procedure for demanding or waiving
the jury trial right.7 FRCP 38 establishes a bright-line rule that places
the demand burden on the party seeking a jury trial.8 That is, a litigant
must specifically demand a jury trial, and if she does not, she waives
this right. In addition to this passive waiver procedure, a litigant may
also actively waive her jury trial right by contract in anticipation of po
tential litigation.9
In disputes over whether a jury trial has been passively waived
under FRCP 38, the Rule clearly provides where the burden of proof
in demanding a jury trial lies: the burden is placed on the party
seeking the jury trial right to demonstrate she has not waived this
right. 10 The placement of this burden is not so clear for contractual
6. See Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 281 (1870); Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 38. The complete text of FRCP 38, Jury Trial of Right, reads as fol
lows:
(a) Rights Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of
right by a jury by (1) serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later
than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue,
and (2) filing the demand as required by Rule 5(d). Such demand may be
indorsed upon a pleading of the party.
(c) Same: Specification of Issues. In the demand a party may specify the
issues which the party wishes so tried; otherwise the party shall be
deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If the
party has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, any other
party within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the
court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all
of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as required by
this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for
trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of the parties.
(e) Admiralty and Maritime Claims. These rules shall not be construed to
create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime
claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1942).
IO. A party who makes a prompt demand pursuant to FRCP 38(b) is entitled to a jury
trial as a matter of right. See, e.g., Previn v. Bare!!, 14 F.R.D. 466, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
Courts determine whether the Rule's "technical requirements" - proper service and filing
- have been fulfilled "with an eye toward fairness." Wauhop v. Allied Humble Bank, 926
F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir. 1991). If a party fails to demand a jury trial pursuant to Rule 38(b),
Rule 39(b) allows the court discretion to grant a jury trial notwithstanding the party's failure
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jury trial waivers. The issue of where to place the burden is ultimately
a conflict between two asserted rights: the Seventh Amendment and
the freedom of contract. On one hand, the Seventh Amendment guar
antees the right to a jury trial.11 Courts that place the burden on the
party seeking enforcement of the contractual waiver value the funda
mental jury trial right over the liberty of contract.12 They ground their
holdings on the jury trial right's hallowed place among the Bill of
Rights and the Supreme Court's declaration of the right as fundamen
tal, 13 relying heavily on the Court's statement in Aetna Insurance Co.
v. Kennedy14 that "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. "15 On the other
hand, individuals have the right to freely and mutually enter into
contracts.16 Courts that have placed the burden on the party seeking to
avoid enforcement appear to value liberty of contract over the right to
a jury trial.17 Instead of indulging a presumption against waiver, these
courts hold there should be a presumption in favor of the validity of
such a waiver contract.18
Although nearly every federal circuit has addressed the issue of
burden placement in contractual jury trial waiver disputes, their opinto make timely demand. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b). The burden of convincing the court to exer
cise such discretion is placed on the demanding party. See Local 783, Allied Indus. Workers
of Am., AFL-CIO v. Gen. Elec. Co., 471 F.2d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 1973); Bloch v.
Fishman, 610 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
11. See supra note 3.
12. See, e.g., Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL
159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989) ("[A]lthough there is a compelling interest in the
preservation of the freedom to contract, there is an even greater interest in guarding the
fundamental right to a jury.").
13. For the leading cases in these circuits, see infra note 19. See also Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 ("A waiver is ordi
narily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."); Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) ("We do not presume acquies
cence in the loss of fundamental rights."); Dimick v. Schied!, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a
place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.").
14. Aetna, 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
15. Id. at 393; see also Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1706 (2003) (Thomas, J., dis
senting) (quoting Aetna).
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1977) (protecting the right of all citizens to make and en
force contracts); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 n.38 (1981) (interpreting 42
U.S.C.§ 1981); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty guaran
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes "the right of the individual to contract").
17. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985) (im
plying as such by placing the burden on the objecting party "in the context of an express
contractual waiver.").
18. See id. (relying on MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which instructs the court to "start
with a presumption in favor of validity in the interest of liberty of contract." 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'll 38.46, at 428-39 (2d ed. 1984)).
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ions have included minimal thoughtful analysis.19 Federal courts
generally recognize contractual jury waivers as valid if they were vol
untary and knowing;20 however, courts disagree as to who bears the
burden of proving or disproving the waiver's validity. Currently, seven
federal circuits place the burden of proving that a contractual jury trial
waiver was voluntary and knowing on the party seeking to enforce the
waiver.21 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, places the burden on
the party seeking a jury trial in contravention of the waiver.22
19. The leading cases in each circuit are as follows:
A First Circuit district court, addressing the validity of a jury trial waiver provision in a
lien agreement, stated only that "even though the First Circuit has not expressed an opinion
as to this matter, we are persuaded that the burden of proving the waiver of such a funda
mental right properly rests upon the party seeking to enforce such a waiver." Luis Acosta,
Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. P.R. 1996).
In a Second Circuit case involving an equipment lease containing a jury trial waiver
provision, the court noted that the jury trial right is fundamental and that a presumption ex
ists against its waiver. Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
Although it did not state as such, by implication the court placed the burden of proving that
the waiver was signed intentionally and knowingly on the lessor, the party seeking waiver
enforcement. See id.
In a Third Circuit commercial contract dispute where one party waived its jury trial
right, a district court, in an unpublished opinion, placed the burden of proving the validity of
the waiver on the party seeking enforcement, relying on the "great[] interest in guarding the
fundamental right to a jury." Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788,
1989 WL 159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989).
In a Fourth Circuit case involving an equipment lease where the lessees waived their jury
trial right, the court stated only that "where waiver is claimed under a contract executed
before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those courts that have held that the party
seeking enforcement of the waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary and
informed." Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986).
A Fifth Circuit district court, addressing the validity of a jury waiver clause in a guaranty,
concluded, without stating a reason, that the party seeking enforcement bears the burden.
RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in the context of a lending agreement containing a
jury waiver clause and stated only that "in the context of an express contractual waiver the
objecting party should have the burden of demonstrating that its consent to the provisions
was not knowing and voluntary." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758.
In a Ninth Circuit case involving a loan agreement containing a jury trial waiver, a dis
trict court, with no analysis other than chronicling what the majority of courts have held,
placed the burden on the lender, the party seeking waiver enforcement. Phoenix Leasing
Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.
1996) (unpublished opinion).
Finally, a Tenth Circuit district court addressing the validity of a jury waiver in a dealer
agreement noted the "strong presumption" in favor of jury trials, thus placing the burden on
the party seeking enforcement. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp.
402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982).
20. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. Some courts use different but similar elements. See, e.g.,
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (knowing and volun
tary); Nat'! Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(voluntary and intentional); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass.
1991) (knowing and intentional).
21. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits place the burden
in this manner. For the leading cases in each circuit, see supra note 20.
22. See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758; Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc.,
56 F. Supp. 2d 982, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
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Among courts that adopt the majority position - those that place
the burden on the party seeking to enforce the jury trial waiver most simply conclude that the court is persuaded, without analysis,
that the burden should be placed on the party seeking to uphold the
waiver.23 Several courts note the jury trial right as fundamental, or
note the presumption in favor of jury trials as espoused in Aetna.24
Some merely point to what the majority of courts have held and hold
likewise.25 Most, however, offer no justification whatsoever for where
they place the burden, or what that burden actually entails.26 More
importantly for this Note, no court in the majority has actually ana
lyzed what Aetna's "every reasonable presumption" means in concrete
terms, or how the specific facts in Aetna inform the analysis. Also, no
court has been explicit about whether a presumption shifts any or all
three of the burdens of proof: pleading, production, and persuasion.27
The Sixth Circuit, which places the burden of proof on the party
seeking to void the waiver, engages in more analysis of the issue than
courts in the majority of circuits, but its analysis suffers from similar
shortcomings.28 Its cases note a presumption in favor of liberty of
contract, but they fail to explain what that presumption entails or how
it comports with the presumption against waivers.29
23. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at
813; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384; Hydramar, 1989
WL 159267, at *2; Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403.
24. See, e.g., Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Hydramar, 1989
WL 159267, at *2; Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403.
25. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384.
26. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at
813; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384, affd, 89 F.3d 846
(9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion).
27. See infra text regarding presumptions and shifting of the burdens of proof accompa
nying notes 39-44.
28. In a Sixth Circuit suit between a borrower and a lender for breach of a financial
agreement, K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985), where the
contractual agreement contained a jury trial waiver, the court relied on MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE for its holding, which states in part:
In determining whether to give effect to the contractual waiver against an objecting party,
the court should start with a presumption in favor of validity in the interest of liberty of
contract. This would require the objecting party to point to some one or more matters that
render the provision improper.
5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'II 38.46, at 428-39 (2d ed.
1984). The court agreed and held that in the context of contractual jury trial waivers, the
objecting party should bear the burden. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758. In a district court
master-service agreement and supplemental-contract dispute, the waiving party argued that
the waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the provision was not "sufficiently
conspicuous." Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 982,
983 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Citing K.M.C., the court concluded that "when a contract contains
an express jury waiver provision, the party objecting to that provision has the burden of
demonstrating that its consent to the waiver was not knowing and voluntary." Id.
29. See, e.g., K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758.
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Observing this split, one is still left with the impression that courts
on either side have yet to truly tackle the burdens of proof and
presumption issues.30 This is understandable.31 Courts have used the
term presumption in a dizzying array of ways,32 and unlike the courts
interpreting the Aetna language seem to suggest,33 there is clearly no
one definition of the term. It is also clear that not all of the uses of the
term necessarily entail a shift in one of the burdens of proof.34 Thus,
given the lack of analysis by courts on either side of the split, and
given the incredible confusion generally on the use of the term
presumption, this Note employs the most systematic of available
approaches.35 It draws on the framework of evidentiary presumptions
and the six presumption types catalogued by scholars36 to decipher
Aetna's "every reasonable presumption" language.37 Only by doing

30. In the area of presumptions, an observer understandably would be pessimistic. As
one legal scholar once observed, "[T]he doctrine of presumptions is clouded with difficulties
and leads to much vain speculation and logical unrealism." JOHN H. WIGMORE , A
STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 454 (1935). Another noted that every
writer who has tried to make sense of presumptions "has left . . . with a feeling of despair."
Edmund M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937).
31. One scholar recently wrote that "[t]he legal term 'presumption' confuses almost
everyone who has ever thought about it. That confusion is fully justified. Not only are the
concepts represented by the term complex, but courts and legislatures have used the term in
many different and often inconsistent ways." Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise
of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697 (1984).
32. See generally Broun, supra note 32.
33. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986); Nat'! Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191
F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15,
18 (D. P.R. 1996); Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev.
1994), affd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion).
34. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come
to This, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 383 (1992). In this article, the author catalogues every use of
the term presumption by Nebraska courts. Amazingly, he includes the following varied uses,
not all of which entail a burden shift: presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion;
Nebraska common-law presumptions that shift the burden of production; legally permissible
inferences from relevant evidence; and rules of law (including so-called "irrebuttable"
presumptions, rules establishing who has the initial burden of proof regarding each essential
element of each issue in a case, rules governing statutory interpretation, rules governing the
interpretation of legal documents, and constitutional presumptions).
35. For the only other work in addition to this Note analyzing the circuit split, see
Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial
Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431 (1997). The author takes the majority
view and argues that courts should make waiving one's right to a jury trial as difficult as pos
sible, thus placing the burden on the party seeking enforcement. For lists of cases and sum
maries without analysis of the split, see David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by
Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1119 (2002); Sternlight, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration, supra note 1; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Waivers in
Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.LR. FED. 688§ 4, at 695-97 (1989).
36. See infra notes 47-52.
37. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 292, 393 (1937).
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this can one analyze the use of the presumption term in Aetna to
determine, in a more logical way than the courts have done, if a
burden should be shifted, and if so, which one.38
This Note argues that in the case of federal contractual jury trial
waiver disputes, courts should adhere only to a permissive presump
tion in favor of jury trials. Part I contends that Aetna is best under
stood as establishing a permissive presumption rather than a manda
tory burden-of-production-shifting presumption. Part II argues that
multiple policy reasons weigh in favor of adhering to a permissive pre
sumption rather than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting pre
sumption.
I.

AETNA I NSURANCE CO. V. KENNEDY ESTABLISHES A

NON-BURDEN-SHIFrING PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION
The law imposes three burdens that a party must satisfy to prove
its case.39 The first is the burden of pleading, or convincing the court
that one has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the law based
on the alleged factual assertions.40 The second is the burden of produc
tion, where one party must demonstrate sufficient evidence to allow a
factfinder to find in that party's favor.41 The third is the burden of per
suasion, where one party must convince the factfinder of some propo
sition in order to render a verdict for that party.42 The party initiating
the suit or seeking a change in the status quo usually bears these three
burdens;43 however, legislatures and courts occasionally shift one or
more of the burdens, usually for public policy reasons.44
Presumptions are one way for legislatures and courts to shift
burdens. In evidentiary terms, they essentially allow the factfinder to
presume that a fact is true if some predicate fact is shown.45 That is, if
38. Scholarly articles and other secondary sources have also failed to analyze the Aetna
statement in terms of presumption categories or the three separate burdens. See Matties,
supra note 35; 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 72, 76 (2003); 50A C.J.S. Juries§ 184 (2002) (citing
without analysis only New York state case law to conclude that the party seeking waiver
should bear the burden).
39. For general introductions to the three burdens making up the burden of proof, see

RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1235-47 (3d ed.
2000); and STEPHEN c. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 719-22 (5th ed. 2000).

40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (7th ed. 1999).
41. Id.
42. Id. In civil cases, the plaintiff's burden is usually by a preponderance of the evidence;
in criminal cases, the prosecution's burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
43. LEMPERT ET AL, supra note 39, at 1236.
44. Id. at 1237.
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (7th ed. 1999) ("presumption[:] A legal inference
or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact
or group of facts.").
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the predicate fact A is proved, then the fact B is presumed to follow.
The type of presumption being used determines how strong the
connection must be from A to B.
Evidence scholars catalogue six presumption types, not all of
which shift a burden:46 permissive inferences;47 permissive presump
tions;48 mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumptions;49 manda
tory burden-of-production-shifting presumptions;50 mandatory burden
of-persuasion-shifting presumptions;51 and conclusive presumptions.52
Although Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 301 provides a default
rule for presumptions in federal court,53 it is used only when the law
creating the presumption does not specify its effect.54
The majority of circuits that have placed the burden of proof in
contractual jury trial waiver disputes on the party seeking to uphold
the waiver have done so by relying on the Supreme Court's statement
in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver."55 No court, however, has
actually investigated the facts and holding of Aetna, nor has any court
parsed the words in this quote to determine the precise nature of this

46. This Note borrows heavily from and thus follows the categorization developed in
LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 39 (six presumption categories). For other categorizations, see
Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, S2 MICH. L. REV.
19S, 196-209 (19S3) (eight presumption categories); and Edmund M. Morgan, Further
Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 24S, 247-49 (1943) (seven presumption
categories).
47. If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B when A is considered along
with all evidence.
48. If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B even if A is the only evidence.
49. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party
claims B is not true.
SO. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party
introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is not true. Sufficient evidence may be defined as
any evidence, reasonable evidence, or substantial evidence.
Sl. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party
persuades the factfinder that B is not true. Persuasion may be defined anywhere from a
preponderance to beyond a reasonable doubt.
S2. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B. Conclusive presumptions are
probably better understood as rules of law, since they cannot be rebutted. See RICHARD
EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 92 (1978); WJGMORE, supra note 31.
S3. FED. R. Evm. 301. FRE 301 reads as follows:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof . . . which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it
was originally cast.
S4. FRE 301 may be relevant since the contractual jury trial waiver disputes at issue
take place in federal court.
SS. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 292, 393 (1937); see also supra note 20.
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presumption.56 This Part examines Aetna and argues that even if it ap
pears to establish a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting
presumption when limited to its own facts (a situation that did not
involve a contract· dispute), when applied to a contractual jury trial
waiver dispute, it establishes only a permissive presumption. This Part
further contends that the Sixth Circuit is correct in holding that the
burden of proof should not be shifted from the party seeking to avoid
the waiver.
The question presented in Aetna to the Supreme Court was
"[w]hether, by their request for directed verdicts, the parties waived
their right to trial by jury."57 At trial, plaintiff Bogash (who had ac
quired Kennedy's interest) and defendant Aetna Insurance Co., hav
ing introduced their evidence and agreed upon the amount of loss sus
tained, both submitted requests for peremptory-jury instructions and
for a directed verdict in their respective favor.58 The district court re
fused both sides' requests and submitted the case to the jury.59 The
jury found for Aetna, and Bogash appealed.60 The circuit court of ap
peals held that the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury on
Bogash's requested instructions, reversed, and ordered a new trial.61
On Bogash's application for rehearing, however, the appeals court
held that "by their requests for peremptory instructions, plaintiff and
defendants assumed the facts to be undisputed and submitted to the
trial judge the determination of the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence and so took the cases from the jury."62 The court denied the
request for rehearing and remanded the case to the district court with
directions to give judgment to Bogash in the amount of the agreed
upon loss.63
The majority of circuits have relied almost exclusively upon
Aetna's language that "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts
56. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co., Inc.
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811 (N.D. Tex.
2002); Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D.
Tenn. 1999); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15 (D. P.R. 1996); Phoenix
Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Nev. 1994), atfd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.
1996) (unpublished opinion); Bonfield v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo.
1982).
57. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 392-93.
58. Id. at 392.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" in determining
where to place the burden of proof in contractual jury trial waiver
disputes.64 That language originates from the following holding:
The established rule is that where plaintiff and defendant respectively
request peremptory instructions, and do nothing more, they thereby
assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge
the determination of the inferences properly to be drawn from them.
And upon review a finding of fact by the trial court under such circum
stances must stand if the record discloses substantial evidence to support
it. But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every rea
sonable presumption against waiver. And unquestionably the parties re
spectively may request a peremptory instruction and, upon refusal of the
court to direct a verdict, have submitted to the jury all issues as to which
opposing inferences may be drawn from the evidence. Here neither the
plaintiff nor the defendants applied for directed verdicts without more.
With their requests for peremptory instructions they submitted other re
quests that reasonably may be held to amount to applications that, if a
peremptory instruction were not given, the cases be submitted to the
jury.65

Analyzed in terms of evidentiary presumptions, Aetna's language
does appear to create some type of burden-shifting presumption for
jury trial waiver disputes.66 Here, both parties to the suit claimed the
same thing (that they requested more than just directed verdicts),
while the trial court "claimed" that they waived their jury trial right;
the appellate court is deciding the dispute.67 Thus, in effect, the
"party" benefiting from any presumption is actually both parties to the
litigation, the "opposing party" is the trial judge, and the "factfinder"
is the appellate court. In terms of the previous catalogue of presump
tions, the predicate fact A is a request for more than a directed ver
dict, and the presumed fact Bis not waiving the jury trial.68
With this in mind, one can survey the six presumption types and
find the appropriate match. The permissive inference and permissive
presumption fail to fit the situation. Both ignore the trial judge's
conclusions,69 contrary to Aetna's holding.70 These presumptions
permit the factfinder to find the presumed fact B without any

64. Id. at 393.
65. Id. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted).

66. Note that Aetna does provide some explanation for the presumption. Since FRE 301
is a default rule that only applies when the law creating the presumption does not specify its
effect, one cannot rely upon it in this case. See FED. R. EVID. 301; see also supra text accom
panying notes 53-54.
67. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 391-94.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
69. See supra notes 48-49.
70. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 394.
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reference whatsoever to the opposing party (here, the trial judge).71
But Aetna clearly references the trial judge, stating that his decision
"must stand if the record discloses substantial evidence."72
The mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumption also fails.
It grants the trial judge too much power, since he need only claim that
there was a waiver.73 Under this presumption, the factfinder must find
the presumed fact B, unless the opposing party merely claims B is not
true.74 This again runs contrary to Aetna's statement that the trial
judge's decision stands only if supported by "substantial evidence."75
The mandatory burden-of-persuasion-shifting presumption does
not appear applicable either. Aetna discusses sufficiency of supporting
evidence in the record,76 not adequacy of persuasion on the part of the
trial judge.77
Finally, the conclusive presumption is too strong. It requires the
factfinder to find the presumed fact B if the predicate fact A is
proven.78 In Aetna's case, the appellate court would be required to find
B (no waiver) if the parties prove A (a request for more than a di
rected verdict).79 Aetna's holding does not so bind the appellate court.
In determining if there is no waiver, Aetna directs the appellate court
to analyze the evidence on the record before the trial judge and the
reasonableness of the parties' proof of their requests for more than a
directed verdict.80 This appellate court discretion conflicts with the
understanding of a conclusive presumption as an nonrebuttable rule of
law.81
The most appropriate match among the six presumption types
therefore appears to be the mandatory burden-of-production-shifting
presumption. That is, if the party (both litigation parties together)
proves A (they each requested more than a directed verdict), then the
71. Under the permissive inference, the factfinder may find the presumed fact B when
the predicate fact A is considered along with all the evidence. Under the permissive
presumption , the factfinder may find B even if A is the only evidence. Both presumptions
ignore the opposing party's claims.
72. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94.
73. See supra note 49.
74. See supra note 49.
75. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94.
76. See id. (stating that the trial judge's decision must stand "if the record discloses
substantial evidence to support it , " without reference to the persuasiveness of that evi
dence).

77. See supra note 51 .
78. See supra note 52.
79. See supra note 52.
80. The parties' other requests "reasonably may be held to amount" to requests for
more than a directed verdict. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94.
81. See supra note 52.
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factfinder (the appellate court) must find B (there was no waiver),
unless the opposing party (the trial judge) introduces evidence suffi
cient to prove B is not true.82 Here, the Supreme Court makes clear
that the required sufficient evidence must be substantial; that is, there
must be "substantial evidence" in the record supporting the trial
court's finding.83
In contrast, the concerns and facts prompting the Court arguably
to create a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption in
the Aetna context are materially different from those surrounding
contractual jury trial waivers. In Aetna, there was no opposing party
relying upon the first party's contractual promise; there was only the
trial judge.84 Thus, the party-litigants' joint claim that they had not
waived the right to a jury trial did not harm the expectations of the
opposing party (there, the trial judge) in any way similar to a contrac
tually bound party. The trial judge may have been harmed in that he
sought to avoid jury trials in order to efficiently administer his court,
but unlike a contract, there had been no consideration, no
bargained-for exchange, and certainly no long-term reliance by the
opposing party.
When contractual jury trial waiver disputes are involved, therefore,
one must reexamine the six presumption categories and find the most
appropriate presumption that 1) upholds the fundamental right of jury
trials, 2) protects the interests of parties to the contract, and 3) follows
Aetna's instruction of indulging a "reasonable presumption."85
With this in mind, the permissive presumption is the most appro
priate.86 In the contractual waiver situation, if the party claims A (her
82. See supra note 50. Recall under the mandatory burden-of-production-shifting
presumption, sufficient evidence may be defined as any evidence, reasonable evidence, or
substantial evidence. See also Aetna, 301 U.S. at 391-94.
83. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393.
84. Id. The appellate court was essentially deciding a "dispute" with the party-litigants
on one side and the trial court judge on the other.
85. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
86. See supra note 48. For the following, assume that A is the predicate fact (the waiver
was not voluntary and knowing), and that B is the presumed fact (there was no waiver). See
supra text accompanying notes 45-54. The other five presumptions catalogued in this Note
do not fit the contractual jury trial waiver scenario nearly as well as the permissive presump
tion. A permissive inference (if the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B when A is
considered along with all evidence) allows the factfinder to conclude too easily that there
was no jury trial waiver, given that any and all evidence may be used to reach that conclu
sion. See supra note 47. The mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumption (if the
party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party claims B is not
true), mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption (if the party proves A, then the
factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is
not true), mandatory burden-of-persuasion-shifting presumption (if the party proves A, then
the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party persuades the factfinder that B is not
true), and conclusive presumption (if the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B)
are all too strong in the other direction. They all leave too little discretion for the factfinder
to find against the party seeking to avoid the waiver if that party proves that the waiver was
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waiver was not voluntary and knowing),87 then the factfinder may find
B (there was no waiver) even if that party's claim of A is the only evi
dence. First, the permissive presumption upholds the fundamental jury
trial right. It allows the factfinder the freedom to find that there was
no waiver even if the signing party can only claim her waiver was not
voluntary and knowing, and is unable to offer other supporting evi
dence.88 Second, the permissive presumption also protects the contrac
tual interests of parties. By not shifting a burden to the party seeking
to uphold the waiver while allowing the factfinder to find against the
party seeking to avoid the waiver with weak evidence,89 the presump
tion protects both parties' expectations.90 Finally, the permissive
presumption is reasonable. It does not alter the normal mechanisms
found in an ordinary contract dispute,91 yet it allows the factfinder the
power to protect the notion of the jury trial.
Aetna's reasonableness language also suggests that the evidence
the waiver-signing party must furnish to prove her jury trial waiver
was voluntary and knowing should be of a reasonable amount.92 To
prove that neither party had limited its application to a motion for di
rected verdict, the Supreme Court stated that the parties "submitted
other requests that reasonably may be held to amount to applications"
for more than directed verdicts.93 Applied to contractual jury trial
waivers, the party claiming an invalid waiver must also submit evi
dence that reasonably may be held to show a lack of voluntariness,
knowledge, or intelligence with respect to the waiver signing. This
relatively easy standard is tempered by the factfinder's discretion that
she may, but need not, find that the plaintiff had not waived her right

not voluntary and knowing. These remaining four presumptions therefore do not protect the
expectations of the parties to the contract enough to satisfy the interests in freedom of
contract recognized in this Note. See supra notes 49-52.

87. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
88. Of course, a factfinder would likely (and probably correctly) find that there was a
valid waiver if the signing party is unable to offer any supporting evidence to her claim that
her waiver was not voluntary and knowing.
89. For the amount of evidence required, see infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
90. It is predicate evidence and contract common law that a party to a contract who
seeks to void it expects to bear the burden of proving the contract is somehow invalid. See 29
AM. JUR. 2o Evidence § 158 (1994) (the burden of proof "generally fall[s] upon the party
seeking a change in the status quo, or upon the party that asserts the claim").

91. The party claiming that an enforceable contract exists bears the burden of proving
formation (offer, acceptance, and consideration), see, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Paige, 193 F. Supp.
2d 145, 152 (D.D.C. 2002), while the party challenging the contract under an affirmative
defense bears the burden of proving that defense, see, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (unconscionability); Harrison v. Grobe, 790 F. Supp. 443,
447 (S. D.N.Y. 1992) (incapacity).
92. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393-94 (1937).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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to a jury trial.94 The court would (1) protect the fundamental right of
jury trial by allowing reasonable evidence to void a waiver; (2)
safeguard the liberty of contract and the opposing party's reliance on a
bargained-for exchange by maintaining discretion to find in the
waiver-seeking party's favor; and (3) indulge the most reasonable pre
sumption in furtherance of Aetna's instructions.
Applying Aetna in this manner shows that the Sixth Circuit
properly declined to shift any burden of proof to the party seeking to
uphold the waiver.95 On its face, Aetna appears to create a mandatory
burden-of-production-shifting presumption, shifting the burden from
the party seeking to avoid the waiver to the party seeking to uphold
it.96 A closer examination of the facts and procedure, however, leads to
a different conclusion. Aetna does not present a situation in which
contractual duties are in effect. Thus, when Aetna's language requiring
the indulgence of "every reasonable presumption" in favor of the jury
trial right is applied to the contractual setting, it is clear that another
type of presumption must be applied.97 Although the Sixth Circuit did
not specifically analyze the presumption present in Aetna, but rather

94. See supra note 48.
95. See supra note 20.
96. Aetna does so by concluding that the Seventh Amendment's jury trial right is
fundamental. 301 U.S. at 393-94. At least one circuit , however, has found an exception to the
jury trial right for complex cases. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980). In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized
that the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather
than the character of the overall action." The Court explained this statement in a footnote:
"As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering ... the
practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. The Third Circuit relied upon this language
to create an exception to the jury trial right for complex cases , stating that "(a] suit is too
complex for a jury when circumstances render the jury unable to decide in a proper
manner. " In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079 (citing Schulz v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956)); see also Douglas King, Comment,
Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 581, 612 (1984). But see Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985); SRI Int'!
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir.1985) (Markay , C.J., joining
with additional views); In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig. , 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979);
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Thus , the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right may not be as fundamental as some courts have stated. The Ross
complexity exception demonstrates that in the split over where the burden should be placed
in contractual jury trial waiver disputes, the majority of courts, by shifting the burden to the
party seeking to uphold the waiver, may be overconfident in their assessment of the funda
mental nature of jury trials in federal civil cases.
97. See Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94; see also supra note 86 for an explanation of why the
five presumptions other than the permissive presumption do not fit the situation as pre
sented in Aetna.
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applied a presumption in favor of liberty of contract,98 the court at
least reached the correct holding.99
II. POLICY REASONS UNDERLIE A PERMISSIVE-PRESUMPTION
INTERPRETATION OF AETNA
In addition to the analysis of Aetna set forth above, two policy con
siderations also support interpreting the presumption in Aetna as a
perm1ss1ve presumption rather than a mandatory burden-of
production-shifting presumption. First, FRCP 38's demand and waiver
procedure is consistent with the permissive presumption. Second,
courtroom and judicial system efficiency concerns support this reading
of Aetna .
A.

FRCP 38's Bright-Line Demand and Waiver Rule

For issues that may involve the jury trial right as protected by the
Seventh Amendment,100 FRCP 38 creates a demand and waiver proce
dure.101 As the Advisory Committee Notes from 1937 state, FRCP 38
"provides for the preservation of the constitutional right of trial by
jury. " 1 02 It makes "definite provision for claim and waiver of jury trial,
following the method used in many American states and in England
and the British Dominions. " 103
FRCP 38 establishes a bright-line standard that places the demand
burden on the party seeking a jury trial. Under this Rule, an individual
is not entitled to a jury trial without a timely demand.104 In this sense,
the Rule fixes a clear presumption against a jury trial and sets a
bright-line standard for when the jury trial right attaches.105
There is no reason why demanding a jury trial that has been
actively waived should be procedurally different from the normal
demand (and passive waiver) procedure in FRCP 38.106 When a party
98. This presumption, found in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, is as confusing as the
one found in Aetna because it is not described in categorical terms. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.

99. See supra note 29.
100. See the description of the historical approach, supra text accompanying note 5.
101. See supra note 7.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 38 advisory committee's notes.

103. Id.
104. See supra note 7.
105. Note here how, in giving application to the jury trial right's fundamental nature, the
facial reading of Aetna (establishing a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presump
tion) is totally inconsistent with the demand and waiver policy established by FR CP 38. See
supra text accompanying notes 65-83.
106. At least one author would argue otherwise:
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waives its right to a jury trial and then attempts to avoid that waiver
(assumedly by arguing the waiver was somehow invalid), the party is
essentially making a demand for a jury trial. There is no intelligible
difference between demanding something that has yet to be granted
and demanding something that has been relinquished.107 Under ordi
nary FRCP 38 normal demand procedure,108 the individual seeking the
jury trial has the burden of making a demand.109 Likewise, for an
avoidance-of-waiver demand procedure, the burden of making the
demand should remain on the party seeking the jury trial. This uni
formity retains FRCP 38's recognition of the jury trial right's impor
tance in the Constitution, honors each party's liberty to waive its jury
trial right by contract, protects parties who have relied on contractual
waivers, and remains consistent with the bright-line demand and
waiver procedure established by the Rule.
The policy behind this uniform structure also meshes well with the
type of presumption argued for in this Note. Whereas the mandatory
burden-of-production-shifting presumption,110 suggested by a superfi
cial reading of Aetna,111 would require that the burden of production
shift to the party opposing the jury trial demand, the permissive
presumption,112 suggested by a more informed reading of Aetna,113
would maintain the burden on the party demanding the jury trial. The
Courts should not treat waivers made before litigation in the same way as waivers made
when litigation has already begun.The issues and stakes are known in current litigation; in
contrast, when a contract is signed far in advance of litigation, much uncertainty exists re
garding problems that could occur "with respect to" the contract.

See Matties, supra note 35, at 463 (citing Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F.
Supp. 1379, 1388 (D. Nev. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion)).
One can, however, make the opposite argument. When a contract is signed far in advance of
litigation, the reliance interest of the opposing party is significantly greater than when the
jury trial right is waived in the context of ongoing litigation. Protecting this interest would
require courts to be more strict with early waivers than with late ones. In addition, whatever
differences exist in what is known about the issues and stakes of the litigation are accounted
for in requiring a waiver before litigation to be voluntary and knowing. See K.M.C. Co., Inc.
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 n.4 (6th Cir.1985).
107. This becomes even clearer when one compares how waiver occurs in the two situa
tions. Under passive waiver, the jury-trial seeker waives his right by simple passage of time.
Under active waiver, the jury-trial seeker has gone out of his way to waive his right. It is un
clear, therefore, why waiver should be more difficult when active relinquishment occurs
rather than mere passive resignation.
108. Where a party demands her jury trial right either in her complaint or answer. See

supra note 10.
109. See supra note 7.
110. To remind the reader: If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless
the opposing party introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is not true. Sufficient evidence
may be defined as any evidence, reasonable evidence, or substantial evidence.
111. See supra Part I.
112. To remind the reader: If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B even if
A is the only evidence.
113. See supra Part I.
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permissive presumption is more consistent with the policy of bright
line demand and waiver present in FRCP 38.114 At the same time, the
permissive presumption protects the fundamental nature of the jury
trial right by allowing the factfinder to grant the party's demand based
on little evidence that the waiver was not signed properly.115
B.

Administrative Efficiency

Allowing pre-litigation jury trial waivers and, in determining the
legitimacy of those waivers, maintaining the burden on the party
seeking to avoid a waiver permit judges to maximize courtroom effi
ciency - one of the goals generally envisioned by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.116 As judges seek to use most effectively their lim
ited time and resources, they use rules and procedures such as FRCP
38117 and various presumptions118 to administer their courts efficiently.
Placing the burden on the party seeking a jury trial and defining
waiver broadly to include "the failure of a party to serve and file a
demand as required by this rule" allows the judge to quickly and easily
decide whether a jury trial is or is not required.119
Some critics argue that an inquiry into whether a contractual
waiver has been properly signed would limit whatever efficiency gains
would come from allowing pre-litigation jury trial waivers and placing
the burden of proof on the party seeking to avoid such a waiver.120
That is, in order to determine whether the jury trial right has been
waived, the court must determine under a fact-intensive investigation
whether the waiver was voluntary and knowing.121 This investigation, it
is argued, would make whatever gains in efficiency from not having a
jury insignificant.

114. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. The permissive presumption looks only
to the proof of demand or waiver supplied by the party seeking the jury trial, creating more
of a bright-line rule than were the court required to shift a burden to the opposing party.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
116. See Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 912 (1990) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting) ("The District Court and today's majority fail to recognize the guiding principle
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle that procedural rules should be
construed pragmatically, so as to ensure the just and efficient resolution of legal disputes.").

.

117. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 , 756 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985)
("Similarly, the rule respecting timely demand for trial by jury is a reasonable requirement
calculated to insure the orderly presentation of the business of the court.").
118. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
119. See supra note 7.
120. See Matties, supra note 35, at 463 ("Because the standard by which contractual jury
waivers are enforced always requires an intensive facts and circumstances inquiry. a
presumption in favor of waiver does not affect the efficiency of trial courts." (footnotes
omitted)).
121. Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
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This argument fails for two reasons. First, it misunderstands the
concept of efficient court administration. FRCP 38's simple demand
and waiver provisions allow for efficient administration in two distinct
ways. The demand procedure's simplicity and the bright-line determi
nation of demand versus waiver allow for quick and simple judgments
about whether a jury is required. More importantly, by easily allowing
jury trial waivers, FRCP 38 decreases jury trial frequency. Cases tried
by judges rather than juries consume less court time and fewer court
resources.122 Applied to the contractual jury trial waiver setting,
allowing for such simple waivers and maintaining the burden of
demand on the party seeking the waiver makes jury trials less
frequent, which again, allows for more efficiently administered
courts.123 Second, the argument that an inquiry into the voluntary and
knowing nature of the waiver would make efficiency gains insignifi
cant fails because it does not take into account this Note's reading of
Aetna as requiring only a permissive presumption in favor of jury
trials.124 The permissive presumption allows the judge to find that the
waiver was not signed properly if the party seeking to avoid the waiver
claims as much.125 As argued in this Note, Aetna's reasonableness lan
guage suggests that the evidence the signing party must furnish to
prove her waiver was not voluntary and knowing is a reasonable
amount.126 Thus, the inquiry into whether the waiver was voluntary
and knowing will be rather restricted. Limiting the inquiry in this
manner combined with maintaining the burden on the party seeking a
jury trial would allow for efficiency in the same manner as ordinary
FRCP 38 waivers, and would therefore not be insignificant. These effi-

122. That is, court proceedings are more streamlined when the court need not contend
with a jury. To name a few examples, jury selection need not be conducted, jury instructions
need not be given, and evidentiary hearings need not be held outside of the jury's ears. See,
e.g. , Matter of Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[J]ury trials are, by na
ture, more time consuming then [sic] bench trials . . . . " (quoting In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 89
B.R. 697, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988))); BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), Societe
Anonyme v. Khalil, 182 F.R.D. 335, 339 (D.D.C. 1998) (mem.) ("In other complex cases,
real efficiencies can be had in trying the case to the Court rather than a jury because of the
greater flexibility available in a bench trial."); Rosen v. Dick, 83 F.R.D. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) ("A bench trial always moves more expeditiously than a jury trial.").
123. This can most easily be seen by comparing the ease of waiver under the two burden
regimes discussed in this Note - shifting the burden to the party seeking to uphold the
waiver, and maintaining the burden on the party seeking to void the waiver. Under the
former, to waive its jury trial right, a party must sign the waiver and the party's opponent
must then produce evidence that the waiver was voluntary and knowing. Under the latter, to
waive its jury trial right, a party must simply sign the waiver. The extra burden placed on the
opposing party in the burden-of-production-shifting regime clearly demonstrates that in the
aggregate, waivers would be more frequent, hence jury trials less frequent, when the burden
is not shifted and a permissive presumption is applied.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
125. See supra note 48.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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ciency goals weigh heavily in favor of this Note's limited reading of
Aetna's presumption favoring jury trials.127
CONCLUSION
This Note analyzes two conflicting policy considerations in the
context of federal court contractual jury trial waiver disputes: the
fundamental nature of the jury trial versus the liberty of contract.
When a party seeks to avoid a previously signed contractual jury trial
waiver, an issue arises in these disputes as to who bears the burden of
proving that waiver was not voluntary and knowing.128 The two
conflicting policies just mentioned have led to opposing holdings
regarding where that burden should be placed. Courts valuing the
fundamental jury trial right over liberty of contract place the burden
on the party seeking enforcement of the waiver,129 pointing to the
Supreme Court's statement in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy that
"as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver."13° Courts valuing the liberty
of contract over the jury trial right place the burden on the party
seeking to avoid enforcement,131 pointing to this value's endorsement
by Moore's Federal Practice.132
This Note argues that in balancing the fundamental right of jury
trial with the liberty of contract, the burden of proof in contractual
jury trial waiver disputes should not be shifted away from the party
seeking to avoid the waiver to the party seeking to enforce the waiver.
Several legal and policy arguments lead to this conclusion. First, an
informed reading of Aetna demonstrates that the case did not require
a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption, but rather a
permissive presumption.133 Such a reading would allow a factfinder the
freedom to find there was no waiver even if the signing party can only
claim her waiver was not voluntary and knowing, but it is unable to
offer any other supporting evidence, and would also protect the
contractual expectations of both parties. Second, policy reasons,
including judicial efficiency and procedural consistency with Federal

127. This is not meant to pit efficiency against the fundamental importance of juries.
Rather , this Note's reading of the Aetna presumption as a permissive presumption rather
than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption is simply more consistent with
the efficiency goal.
128. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
130. 301 U.S. at 393.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
132. MOORE ET AL. , supra note 29.
133. See supra Part I.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 38's bright-line demand and waiver proce
dure, support the conclusion that the burden should not be shifted.134

134. See supra Part II.

